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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
court, and the functions of a judge. Whether an act is to be performed by
the court or the judge is generally determined by the character of the act.
Whenever it is a statutory power or duty conferred upon the court, it can
only be discharged by the assembled tribunal, "however composed, whether
of one judge or several." Is The power of removal or appointment of school
directors,' 9 public officials,20 and guardians, is conferred upon the court and
"court" means court en bane.
21
The Pennsylvania position seems the more reasonable in differentiating
the stated questions. It is highly improbable that the drafters of the Florida
Constitution intended to have the opinion of one circuit judge bind the full
circuit in the interpretation of constitutional and statutory powers conferred
on that circuit. Such a conclusion would be illogical in that the minority
opinion of one, asserted first, could prevail. This would be especially true
if the remaining judges not participating, were to have a contrary opinion.
Certainly this question is important enough to have merited a discussion in
the majority opinion.
Arthur J. Franza
COURTS - JUDICIAL IMMUNITY VS. CIVIL RIGHTS
Plaintiff, confined as a delinquent t on an order issued without notice
or hearing in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
brought an action by virtue of the Civil Rights Act' against the judge who
promulgated the order. Held, the judicial immunity of a judge acting
within his authority is not derogated by the Civil Rights Act. Francis v.
Lyman, 108 F. Supp. 884 (D. Mass. 1952).
The principle that exempts judges from civil liability for acts in the
exercise of their judicial functions has "a deep root in the common law." 3
Judges are not civilly liable when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, 4
18. Moritz v. Luzerne County Co., 283 Pa. 349, 352, 129 Ati. 85, 86 (1925).
19. In re tIanover Township School Directors, 290 Pa. 95, 137 Atl. 811 (1927).
20. Novak v. Koprivsek, 58 York 16, 29 North 201 (1944).
21. Carter's Estate, 254 Pa. 518, 99 Atl. 58 (1916).
1. MAss. GEN. LAWS C. 123, § 116 (19325.
2. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 8 U.S.G. § 43 (1946) "Every person who, under
color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the U. S. . . . to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . for redress."
3. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 (N.Y. 1810); Bradley v. Fisher. 13 Wall.
335 (U.S. 1871); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2nd Cir. 1926), aofd, 275 U.S. 503
(1927); Allen v. Biggs, 62 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass.
187, 197 N.E. 884 (1935); Landscidel v. Culernan, 47 N.D. 275, 181 N.W. 593 (19211;
Hammond v. Howell, 2 Mod. 218, 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1678); 2 COOLEY, Tors 420
et. seq. (4th ed. 1932).
4. As distinguished from acts where no jurisdiction over the subject matter exists.
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (U.S. 1871); Randell v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523 (U.S.
1868); Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 187, 197 N.E. 884 (1935).
CASES NOTED
or even when such acts are performed maliciously or corruptly.5 The
immunity extends to judges of courts of superior or gencral jurisdiction' as
well as to lower courts7 and judicial officers,8 and is a fundamental prin-
ciple of English and American jurisprudence."
The immunity exists, not for the benefit of the judgc, but for the
benefit of the public. The general welfare requires that the judiciary exercise
its functions with independence uncontrolled by fear of adverse conse-
quences to themselves. 10 The public's protection is contained in the power
of appeal, and the weapon of impeachment which can be directed toward
corruption or misconduct."
A contrary result was reached in the Picking case. There the Circuit
Court held that, if the plaintiffs brought a proper proceeding which was
refused hearing, the judge may be answerable in damages under the Civil
Rights Act.' 3  "The statute must be deemed to include members of the
state judiciary acting in official capacity. The result is of fateful portent
to the judiciary of the several states."14
In the instant case, the court stated that the Picking case was unsound.
Although it appears on first glance, by Congressional use of the words
'every person"'' that judicial immunity was ended, the court added that
if Congress were going to abrogate so sacred a principle of the common law,
they would have done so "in plain terms.""' This conclusion is justified on
the basis of public policy which requires a judiciary who may speak freely
without fear of reprisal. The court intimated that the ability of the
judiciary to serve the public would be seriously hampered if the Civil Rights
Act T were read so as to destroy judicial immunity.
The decision in the instant case appears sound. The principle of
judicial immunity is recognized in any well-ordered system of jurisprudence' 8
5. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 \Vall. 335 (U.S. 1871).
6. Mbid; Randell v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523 (U.S. 1869); Weaver v. Devendorf, 3
Denio 117 (N.Y. 1846).
7. Cooke v. Banks, 31 Fed. 640 (C.C. Minn. 1887); Calder v. lalket, 3 Moo.
P.C. 28, 13 Eng. Rep. 12 (1839).
8. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), arf'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
9. Ibid; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810).
10. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 \ValI. 335 (U.S. 1871); Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 187,
197 N.E. 884 (1935); Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62, 54 N.W. 938 (1893); Yates v.
Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810); Landseidel v. Coleman, 47 NiD. 275, 181 NWV.
593 (1921); Floyd v. Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608); Taaffe v.
Downes, 3d Moo. P.C. 35, 13 Eng. Rep. 15 (1813); Jennings, Tort Liability of Admninis-
trative Officers in 4 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONsrrrUTIONAL LAw 1271 1938).
11. Cooke v. Bangs, 31 Fed. 640 (C.C. Minn. 1887); Pratt v. Gardner, 2 CLush.
63 (Mass. 1848).
12. Picking v. Penn. R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
776 (1947); see, McShane v, Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949).
13. See note 2 supra.
14. Picking v. Penn. R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 250 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 776 (1947).
15. See note 2 suopra.
16. Francis v. Lyman, 108 F. Supp, 884, 887 (D. Mass. 1952).
17. See note 2 supra.
18. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (U.S. 1871).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
and it is important to an enlightened and impartial judiciary that the
principle be perpetuated. This conclusion is in line with the recent Supreme
Court ruling of Tenney v. Brandhove.10  The court there excluded mem-
bers of a state legislature from claims arising out of the Civil Rights Act,
based on the rationale that any other result would destroy legislative freedom
of judgment. The holding of the Picking case does not seem to be based
on sound reasoning, principle, or authority. Rather, it was an attempt to
import into an act of Congress an interpretation which would tend to
destroy the very nature of the judiciary. With the noted case, the well
established principle of judicial independence has been reaffirmed. 2
Richard I. Goodman
FAMILY LAW - PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS - VALIDITY
OF BLOOD TESTS
A married woman brought paternity proceedings against a party not
her husband. Husband and wife, though cohabiting, testified to non-access
and the results of blood grouping tests excluded the husband as the possible
father. Held, action dismissed because the presumption of legitimacy bad
not been overcome. Complaint of Dunn, 115 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Children's
Ct. 1952).
No principle of law is more finnly established than that which
presumes every child born in wedlock to be legitimate.' However, a child
born to a married woman begotten by one not her husband may be con-
sidered a child born out of wedlock 2 . To overcome the presumption of
legitimacy evidence of non-access, where admissible, may be introduced
to prove adulterous intercourse resulting in the disputed issue. 3 There is a
19. Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
20. "No man would accept the office of judge, if his estate were to answer for
every error in judgment, or if his time and poperty were to be wasted in litigations with
every man whom his decisions might offend." Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day's Conn. Rep. 315,
329 (1804).
1. CAL.. CIv. CODE § VTC (1941); CAL. CODE CIv. PROc. ANNOTATIONS §§ 1962,
1963 (1941); Dill v. Patterson, 326 11. App. 511, 62 N.E.2d 249 (1945); Heath v.
Heath, 222 Iowa 660, 269 NAV. 761 (1936); Bassil v. Ford Motor Co., 278 Mich. 173,
270 N.W. 258 (1937); Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (Ch.
1940); Harding v. Harding, 22 N.Y.S.2d 810, aff'd 261 App. Div. 924, 25 N.Y.S.2d
525 (2d Dep't 1940); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 163 Misc. 98, 297 N.Y. Supp. 642 (Dom. Rcl.
Ct. 1937); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 177 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
2. Jones v. State, 11 Ga. App. 760, 76 S.E. 72 (1912); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw
§ 119, Complaint of Vincent, 284 N.Y. 260, 30 N.E.2d 587, aff'd 259 App. Div. 835,
20 N.Y.S.2d 172 (2d Dep't 1940) ("out of lawful matrimony" refers to status of
natural parents); N.D. REv. ConE §§ 14-0901, 14-0902, 14-0903 (1943), North Dakota
v. Coliton, 17 N.W.2d 546 (N.D. 1945).
3. CaL. CIv. CODE §§ 193, 194, 195 (1941); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. ANNOTATIONS
§§ 1962, 1963 (1941) (parents cannot testify to non-access); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 273,
§§ 7, 16; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 5830, § 10605 subdivision 5, § 10606 (1935);
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 126; Hubert v. Cloutier, 135 Mo. 230, 194 Atl. 303 (1937);
